خلاصة:
یکی از مباحث مهم عقلی، تقسیم مفاهیم کلی به سه قسم مفاهیم ماهوی، منطقی و فلسفی است. لازم به ذکر است که سهروردی و حکیمان پیش از او تنها متوجه تفاوت بین مفاهیم حقیقی و اعتباری شده و آن‌ها را در دو دسته عینی و ذهنی قرار داده بودند و تا زمان ملاصدرا این تقسیم منحصر در معقولات اولی(مفاهیم ماهوی) و معقولات ثانوی(مفاهیم منطقی) بود و جایگاه مفاهیم فلسفی روشن نبود. به صورتی که سهروردی مفاهیم وجود، وحدت، کثرت، وجوب، امکان، لونیت و... را بدون تفکیک مفاهیم منطقی از فلسفی ذیل اعتباریات گنجانده بود و عمده ترین دلیل وی بر عدم مغایرت و عدم زیادت این مفاهیم در خارج، تکرر و تسلسل محالی بود که از اجتماع صفات نامتناهی ناشی می‌شد. برای فهم دقیق این بحث، پژوهش حاضر با تکیه بر تعلیقات ملاصدرا بر شرح حکمه الاشراق سهروردی، عهده دار بحثی تفصیلی از جزئیات اقوال و بیانات سهروردی در مورد مفاهیم اعتباری و نقدهای ملاصدرا بر اوست.
Introduction This research deals with Mulla Sadra’s objections to constructed (iʿtibari) concepts in Illuminationist philosophy. A major philosophical issue in Islamic philosophy today is a division of universal concepts into quiddity-based (mahuwi), logical, and philosophical. Suhrawardi and philosophers before him had just discerned the difference between real (haqiqi) and constructed concepts, placing them respectively into objective and subjective categories, and until Mulla Sadra’s time, the division was restricted to first intelligibles (al-maʿqulat al-ula) or quiddity-based concepts and secondaryintelligibles (al-maʿqulat al-thaniya) or logical concepts, and the place of philosophical concepts was not clear. Accordingly, Suhrawardi subsumes concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, and colorfulness under constructed concepts without drawing a distinction between logical and philosophical concepts. This was mainly because there is no distinction between these concepts in the external world, and because repetition and vicious regress would follow if infinite attributes coextensively existed. In addition to his critique of Suhrawardi for having distinguished concepts into subjective and objective, Mulla Sadra challenged Suhrawardi’s views of each of these concepts. Research Method or Approach This research adopts a fundamental descriptive-analytic method and relies on Mulla Sadra’s commentaries on Suhrawardi’s Sharh hikmat al-ishraq (Exposition of the wisdom of illumination) to elaborately deal with Suhrawardi’s remarks concerning constructed concepts and Mulla Sadra’s objections to these views. Data of the research have been collected through a library method, and cases were extracted by indexing. Finally, by drawing on the intellectual method, the indexed contents were analyzed and criticized, and the views were critically analyzed and considered. Discussion and Conclusion Here is a summary of findings of the research: A major contribution of Suhrawardi concerning concepts was a division of concepts into subjective and objective, by which all philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, colorfulness, and relation are subsumed under purely constructed concepts, without corresponding to anything in the external reality. Suhrawardi’s main reason for the negation of external distinction in the case of philosophical concepts is that the coextensive existence of infinite attributes implies vicious regress and repetition, since in his Talwihat, Suhrawardi proposes a criterion for the distinction between the subjective and the objective and for the impossibility of the distinction in the external world, according to which everything whose occurrence implies repetition and regress counts as constructed. Major objections raised by Mulla Sadra against Suhrawardi’s account of constructed concepts, which serves as the foundation and tenet of the rest of his objections, are as follows: Absence of any distinction between philosophical and logical secondaryintelligibles Confusion between concepts and their instances Failure to take account of the organic composition (al-tarkib al-ittihadi) between quiddities and existences Conflation of the name and what is named Confusion between primary essential predication (al-haml al-awwali al-dhati) and common technical predication (al-haml al-shaʾiʿ al-sunaʿi). Given these findings, the obstacles, problems, and proposals of the research are as follows: While most of Mulla Sadra’s objections are accurate and based on his insights into the problem of intelligibles, some of his objections are not plausible because of their anachronistic nature. Although in some cases, Suhrawardi’s remarks are attacked and even undermined by Mulla Sadra’s objections, in some cases it is open to us to criticize and adjudicate the two parties and even offer novel contributions to the debate since Mulla Sadra has rested content with Avicenna’s views, among other predecessors, and did not offer an alternative account.
ملخص الجهاز:
(9 سهروردی در حکمه الاشراق نیز، مشابه همین بیان صـفات را بـه عینـی و ذهنـی تقسـیم کرده است : همه صفات بر دو قسـم اسـت : [اول ] صـفت عینـی و دارای صـورتی در عقـل ، ماننـد سیاهی، سفیدی و حرکت ، و [دوم ] صفتی کـه وجـود خـارجی آن فقـط همـان وجـود ذهنی آن است ، و در غیر ذهن وجودی ندارد.
چنانکــه وی در کتــاب تلویحــات پــس از نفــی زیــادت وجــود بــر ماهیــت ، متوجــه وحدت شده و میگوید همان طور که وجود زیادتی بر ماهیت ندارد، وحـدت نیـز در اعیـان وراء ماهیتی که بر آن حمل میشود، نیست (سهروردی، ١٣٧٥الـف ، ج ١، ٢٣)؛ در مطارحـات نیز، مینویسد: ما با آن کس که قایل به موجودیت نفس وجود اسـت ، مـدارا کـرده و مـیگـوییم حـال وجود و وحدت نزد شما، در بودن آن دو در اعیان یکی اسـت ، و نـزد مـا هریـک از آن دو اعتبار عقلی است ، و گـرفتم کـه شـما زنجیـره بـینهایـت را در وجـود، بـه عنـوان موجودیت نپذیرفتید، ولی شـکی نیسـت کـه وجـود و وحـدت دو مفهـوم مختلفنـد و هریک بدون دیگری تعقل میشوند؛ بنـابر ایـن هـیچ وقـت معنـی وحـدت ، بـه وجـود بازنمیگردد و معنی وجود بـه وحـدت بـاز نخواهـد گشت (سـهروردی، ١٣٧٥ج ، ج ١، .
amusannafat-i Shaykh Ishraq: Hikmat al-ishraq (Collected works of Suhrawardi: Philosophy of illumination).
ala sharh hikmat al- ishraq (Mulla sadra’s commentaries on the exposition of philosophy of illumination).
(
, 
, 
)
