خلاصة:
پژوهشهای آسیبشناسانه برای آشنایی با ابعاد مختلف فساد و اندازهگیری پیامدها و آثار آن بر ارکان مختلف جامعه ضرورت دارد. پژوهشگران اغلب براساس شاخصهای ادراکی و از سویی در سطح ملی، فساد را بررسی کردند. نوآوری این پژوهش در بهرهگیری از دو مزیت مستندات عینی و ابعاد محلی در تعریف شاخص فساد است. با مقایسۀ دادههای نمونهای متشکل از شرکتهای منتخب بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، طی دورۀ 1392-1385 در مناطق با فساد بیشتر و مناطق با فساد پایینتر، بازدۀ مالی شرکتها در سطح مناطق تجزیهوتحلیل شد و نشان از آن داشت که وجود فساد در سطح استانها، بازدۀ دارایی و کیوتوبین شرکتها را افزایش میدهد؛ همچنین این پژوهش رابطۀ فساد، حاکمیت شرکتی و بازدۀ مالی شرکتها را با استفاده از روش دادههای تابلویی بررسی میکند. نتایج نشاندهندۀ تأثیر مثبت فساد بر بازدۀ دارایی و کیوتوبین شرکتهاست؛ در حالی که استقلال هیئتمدیره و تمرکز مالکیت رابطۀ معناداری با بازدۀ دارایی و کیوتوبین ندارد.
AbstractResearchers have often examined corruption based on perceptual criteria and nationally. The innovation of this research was to take the two advantages of objective documentation and local dimensions in defining the corruption index. This study used a local and objective variable of corruption by comparing the sample data consisting of the selected companies of Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the period of 2006-2013 in regions with high and low corruptions. Analysis of the financial return of firms at the regional level showed that the existence of corruption at the provincial level increased Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. This study also examined the relationship between corruption, corporate governance, and firm financial return by using the panel data method. The results revealed the positive effect of corruption on the firm’s ROA and Tobin’s Q, while board independence and ownership concentration did not have a significant relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q.IntroductionFirms are considered to be the main sources of job creation, economic growth, and development of societies and are of great importance to governments. Therefore, identifying the positive and negative factors affecting the financial return of firms and trying to manage them properly provide a powerful tool to support them. Given the importance of recognizing corruption and its effects and the effective role of corporate governance in corporate returns as the economic factors affecting economic growth, the main aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between corruption, corporate governance, and firm’s financial return. It should be noted that the study of corruption at the provincial level and its effects on the firm’s financial return has not been done in Iran; it was examined for the first time in this study. Method and DataIn this research, 34 selected companies of Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the 8-year period of 2006-2013 were examined. To provide the required statistics and information about the firms, the documented data published by Tehran Securities and Exchange Organization were used. The provincial corruption data were extracted from the Statistical Center of Iran and the statistical yearbook.A univariate test was done to evaluate the difference between Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q in two regions of high and low corruptions. The comparison was done after calculating the average ROA and Tobin’s Q of the companies in each region.To examine the impact of corruption, board independence, and ownership concentration on the firm's financial return, the following relationships were considered:𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖t + 𝛽2 Board Independency𝑖t + 𝛽3Ownership Concentration𝑖t + 𝛽4Size𝑖t + 𝛽5Age𝑖t + 𝛽6Leverage𝑖t + 𝛽7Cash𝑖t + 𝑢𝑖t (1) where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖t (return on assets) is a dependent variable and 𝛽0 is the intercept; 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖t, Board Independency𝑖t, and Ownership Concentration𝑖t are independent variables; the control variables include Size𝑖t (size of firm), Age𝑖t (firm age), Leverage𝑖t (financial leverage), and Cash𝑖t (cash ratio); and 𝑢𝑖t is the error term. In Equation 2, by replacing ROA with Tobin’s Q (ratio of market value to firm book value) in the above model, we will have: 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖t + 𝛽2Board Independency𝑖t + 𝛽3Ownership Concentration𝑖t + 𝛽4Size𝑖t + 𝛽5Age𝑖t + 𝛽6Leverage𝑖t + 𝛽7Cash𝑖t + 𝑢𝑖t (2) FindingsAccording to the values in Table 1, which shows the descriptive statistics information of the research variables, it can be said that the variables have a balanced distribution and relative symmetry. The results of Independent Samples Test showed that the ROA and Tobin’s Q of the firms located in the region with high corruption compared to those in the region with low corruption were significantly higher. The results are presented in Table 2.Since the regression method used here was panel data, the model estimation was confirmed by the panel method with fixed effects after performing Levin, Lin and Chu, F-Limer, Hausman, and Pesaran unit tests. The results of estimation by the Equation 1, which examined the effects of the variables on the ROAs of the companies are displayed in Table 3. These results confirmed the hypothesis that the relationship between corruption and ROA was positive and significant and rejected the hypothesis that the effects of board independence and ownership concentration on firm asset returns were significant. Table 4 reports the results of estimating the effects of the variables on the ratios of market value to the book value of the firms (Tobin`s Q) by Equation 2. These results confirmed the hypothesis that the relationship between corruption and Tobin`s Q was significant and positive and rejected the hypothesis that the effects of board independence and ownership concentration on Tobin`s Q were significant. Conclusion and discussion The average ROA and Tobin`s Q in the firms located in the region with high corruption was significantly higher than those in the firms located in the region with low corruption. Its reason could be circumventing the complicated, lengthy, and time-consuming bureaucracy process by paying bribes in the more corrupted areas. Therefore, the geography of corruption seemed to affect the financial returns of firms. The relationship between corruption and financial return was positive and significant. This relationship was consistent with the univariate test findings of the independent samples. Confusing the policies and laws in production, trade, and investment seemed to have limited corporate strategic policies and allowed the bureaucracy to abuse power. In such a situation, the firms considered the costs of corruption less than the costs of challenging the bureaucracy. The presence of non-executive directors on the board and the boards governed by non-executive directors had not been able to have a positive effect on ROA and Tobin`s Q. The reason could be the role, which the executive managers played in selecting non-executive managers. The relationship of major shareholder ownership with ROA and Tobin`s Q was not significant, which might be due to the lack of supervision of the major shareholder over the firms’ performance resulting in the prominent role of the state-owned enterprises as major shareholders that were less sensitive to the private sector.