چکیده:
در برخی از آیات قرآن کریم از واژة «خزائن» سخن به میان آمده است. مفسران در حقیقت و چیستی «خزائن» دارای وحدت نظر نبوده و اختلاف نظرهای قابل توجهی در میان ایشان به چشم میخورد. در تفاسیر عقلی-کلامی اعم از شیعه و اهل سنت، چهار مصداق درباره مفهوم خزائن مطرح شده است که عبارتند از «باران»، «عناصر و اسباب مادی خلقت»، «مقدورات الهی» و «علم الهی». نگارنده در نوشتار حاضر میکوشد تا با روشی توصیفی- تحلیلی و ضمن بهرهگیری از مبانی حکمت متعالیه و مستندات فلسفی، اشکالات وارد بر مصادیق مذکور را بررسی نماید. وی دیدگاه نوینی که عبارت است از «تفسیر وجودی خزائن»، برای مصداق «خزائن» برگزیده و علت اختلاف نظر مفسران در تفسیرشان از خزائن را در تفسیر ناقص ایشان از مفهوم و مصادیق خزائن میداند.
There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. Another group of verses of a similar vein are those concerning “treasuries of Allah” (khazaʾin Allah). The predicament is that people tend to collect valuable things in treasuries only because they have a limited power and cannot have what they want whenever they do, but this is not true of God, because of His unlimited, unconstrained power and knowledge. According to Quranic exegetes, there are two types of “divine treasuries”: Worldly treasuries Otherworldly treasuries (those of the absolute hidden world) There are different views of the nature of “divine treasuries” proposed by exegetes of the Quran and Muslim philosophers. We begin with views propounded by Quranic exegetes in philosophical-theological exegeses of the Quran. Major views of this sort have been offered in the exegesis of verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr in the Quran. These views might be classified into four: Rains Material elements and occasions of creation Divine predestinations Divine knowledge In a number of his exegetical and philosophical works, Mulla Sadra has presented his account of “divine treasuries.” In line with his philosophical principles, he construes divine treasuries as intellectual entities; that is, as a particular stage of divine knowledge (after that of divine grace or ʿinayat), which mediates the emanation of divine blessings or grace to creatures—a stage in which the forms of everything inheres in an intellectual way. A systematic, rational rendering of Mulla Sadra’s account of divine treasuries requires a proper elaboration of his philosophical principles associated with divine knowledge, including the primacy of existence (isalat al-wujud), gradation of existence (tashkik al-wujud), objectivity of knowledge and existence, etc. The following are the questions we consider in this paper: How do theological exegeses of the Quran account for the notion of “divine treasuries”? What problems do they face? What are Mulla Sadra’s philosophical principles underlying his account of divine treasuries? How does his account treat the problems faced by other accounts? What other account of divine treasuries might be yielded, which is still compatible with the principles of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy? To answer these questions, we begin with a literal definition of “treasuries of Allah” and then overview the accounts provided by exegetes and their problems. Next, we offer a detailed account of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical principles as preliminary to a proper account of “divine treasuries.” Articles have been published about “divine treasuries,” including “Divine treasuries” by Muhammad Husayn Hishmatpur (2005), “A critical analysis of Mulla Sadra’s view of treasuries in light of structural semantics” by Mahdi Baqiri and Ahad Faramarz Qaramaliki (2018) and “A critical application of the theory of conceptual mixture in al-Mizan’s reading of divine treasuries” again by Mahdi Baqiri and Ahad Faramarz Qaramaliki (2017). We conclude that, of the four accounts outlined in this paper, the first three suffer from numerous problems, and thus they fail to yield an adequate account of the Quranic notion of divine treasuries. In our view, the fourth view—that is, Mulla Sadra’s philosophical account—has failed to offer a full-fledged account of instances of divine treasuries. Accordingly, we propounded a fourth view, which is an extension of Mulla Sadra’s account. We argue how a proper, reasonable account of the notion of divine treasuries can be made possible by an elaboration of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical principles concerning divine knowledge and its degrees, and by drawing on characteristics of divine treasuries as outlined in the Quran, particularly verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr. We show that this revised Sadraean account is immune to the objections raised against other theories. On this account, divine treasuries suggest God’s knowledge of the measures of everything before its descent; that is, its creation. Moreover, on Mulla Sadra’s principles, treasuries are of two sorts: worldly and otherworldly, where the latter is of two kinds in turn: objective and subjective (or cognitive). Objective treasuries are entities existing in imaginal (mithal) and intellectual (ʿaql) worlds, and subjective treasuries are entities existing in the world of divine names and attributes. This is an “existential account of divine treasuries,” which might apply to all degrees of existence and creation.
خلاصه ماشینی:
٤. مصداق خزائن الهی از دیدگاه مفسران مهم ترین آراء مفسرین درمورد مصداق و حقیقت «خزائن » در قرآن ذیل آیۀ: « وَ إِنْ مِنْ شَـی ءٍ إِلاَّ عِنْدَنا خَزائِنُهُ وَ ماُ ننَزُِّلهُ إِلاَِّ بقَدَرٍ مَعْلُوم ٍ: هیچ چیز نیست مگـر ایـن کـه خزانـه هـای آن نـزد ماست و ما آن را جز به اندازه معین فرونمیفرستیم »(حجر/٢١)، مطرح شده اسـت کـه در ٤ قسم قابل دسته بندی است : ١.
٢- از آنجا که طبق مبنای فلسفی صدرا، مراتب علم الهی شامل صور تفصیلی همۀ اشـیاء هستند، لذا در قول به علم بودن خزائن ، عمومیت «شیء» در آیۀ ٢١ سورة حجر بـه صـورت خود باقی خواهد ماند و هیچ اشکالی بر آن وارد نخواهد شد؛ زیـرا صـور جمیـع اشـیاء بـر وجه عقلی در خزائن وجود دارند.
٣- با تفسیر خزائن به علم الهی بـه عنـوان یکـی از مراتـب وجـود، واژة «قـدر» در آیـۀ مذکور که ملازم لاینفک نزول از خزائنِ وجودی است ، به معنای صرف «اندازة عـددی» کـه مختص موجودات مادی است ، نخواهد بود؛ بلکه بـه معنـای خصوصـیت وجـود و یـا حـد وجود خواهد بود که مطابق و هماهنگ با عمومیت واژة قدر برای همۀ موجـودات در سـایر آیات قرآن همچون «َ قدْ جَعَلَ الَّلهُِ لکُلِّ شَی ءٍَ قدْراً»(طلاق / ٣) است .
در نهایت با توجه به اشکالات متعددِ وارد بر این مبنای فکری متکلمـین یعنـی اعتقـاد بـه زائـد بودن صفات بر ذات که سبب تعدد قدما و شرک بر خداوند است ، قول به علم بودن خـزائن نسبت به قول دیگر که خزائن را بر مقدورات منطبق میدانند، کامل تر خواهد بود.
این همان «تفسیر وجودی خزائن » اسـت کـه قابـل تطبیق بر همۀ مراتب وجود و خلقت خواهد بود.