خلاصة:
Once the responsibilities of central bank increases, developing good governance for achieving its different aims to satisfy the required statutory power becomes more complicated. In the case of the central bank of Islamic republic of Iran - as monetary policymaker and supervisor-this issue is valid as well. Considering the necessity of independency, accountability, and transparency for developing good governance to achieve required statutory power, current laws on the central bank and banking, and the bills on these laws have been evaluated. Since these bills have not been developed based on the importance of the main pillars of central bank governance regarding its core functions and the current laws do not support these pillars as well, we cannot expect that the central bank attains required statutory power. Hence, these bills should be modified to consider these pillars and enhance the level of central bank’s governance and its statutory power.
ملخص الجهاز:
"Table 1: Indicators of Political and Economic Independence of the Central Bank Indicators Scope 1-Not choosing the central bank governor by the government (independent mechanism for choosing the central bank governor) 2-Appointment of the governor for more than 5 years (staggered term) 3-Appointing some non-governmental bodies in Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 4-Appointment of MPC members for more than 5 years 5-Not requiring the presence of government deputies in MPC 6-Not requiring the approval of monetary policy by the government 7-Considering monetary stability as the central bank’s goal 8-Existence of sufficient laws on enforcing the central bank’s situation in the case of disagreement between the central bank and the government 1-Lending to the government under the control of the central bank 2-Lending to the government under market interest rate 3-Lending to the government under temporary conditions 4-Lending to the government under limited amount 5-Not being obliged to settle public debts 6-Setting discount rate (and other monetary instruments) by the central bank 7-Not being responsible for banking supervision 8-Not being the only authority in charge of banking supervision Source: Elsan (2013) Regarding the authority that nominates the candidate, current law ends up in lower independence of the central bank comparing to the bill on the new law.
Totally, it is suggested that for enhancing the statutory power of the central bank of Islamic republic of Iran, besides the monetary policymaking and supervisory functions scrutinized in this paper, other functions of the central bank should also be analyzed, especially based on the importance of developing required governance according to three aforementioned pillars."