خلاصة:
onnecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (lobbying) or paying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are the two main strategies for influencing government. This study in an evolutionary game model explain why bribing may become widespread while other states like compliance and cooperative lobbying are Pareto superior. The theoretical model is used to study the effect of social parameters on firm’s choice between lobbying and bribing. The results indicate that social disapproval of bribery has a negative impact on corruption. The effect, however, depends on the history of countries. Countries with a long history of corruption have much more difficult task in fight with corruption. Cooperation was the second social factor to be investigated. The effect of cooperation on lobbying is indirect through alleviating the difficulty and costs of linking to the government. Whenever and wherever linking is difficult, firms by cooperation, can make it less impeding.
ملخص الجهاز:
Lobbying, Bribery, and Compliance: An Evolutionary Model of Social Factors Abbas Khandan*1 Received: 2017, February 8 Accepted: 2017, December 4 Abstract onnecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (lobbying) orpaying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are thetwo main strategies for influencing government.
Π = { � = � � �� + � � � � + � � � � = (ℛ − �) + ℋ� − � � � � = � � � + � � � �� + � � � �� = (ℛ − )� − � � } (1)� � = � � ��� + � � � �� + � � � �� = (ℛ + ℛ ) − ℒ� � − � � � �� = � � � 1 − � � ���� ������ = �ഥ� , �� + � = � − �ഥ� ��� Figure 2: Payoffs of Different Strategies for a Given Population of Compliers Lobbying is strictly dominated by compliance strategy because of the assumption (2) which according to free-riding is profitable even if there is risk of receiving punishment.
1. Esteban and Ray (2001); Marwell and Pamela (1988; 1993) xL=0 �� � xL* � � � − �ഥ��� � � Figure 9: Payoffs of Different Strategies for a Given Compliers Population According to dynamic equations (3), (4), (5), an increase in synergy ψ or the marginal benefit of cooperation ℋ influence positively on lobbyists’ population but decreases the number of bribers and compliers.