خلاصة:
The first mistaken conception is this. Some Muslim theorists argue that only God can
proclaim what justice, right, and rights are; hence parliaments and other state
institutions lack the sovereignty to create laws and to proclaim rights. They presume
that Western states in their legislation and the UN in their Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948 claim such sovereignty. Many Western theorists share their
view, differing only in the evaluation. But human rights imply that states must follow
them and lack the sovereignty for legislation incompatible with them. The German
constitution is explicit on this lack of human sovereignty. It declares in Art.1: “e
following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as
directly applicable law.” Hence, the idea of human rights implies that human rights
and basic principles of legislation are valid not because states have declared them but
because of their inherent qualities. It also implies that states are legitimate only if they
conform to such basic principles and excludes the idea that the principles are
legitimate because states or mankind have accepted them. Therefore, Western and
Islam conceptions of law and sovereignty are less different than they seem. Second, it
is generally accepted in Islam and the West that there is a right and even the duty of
every human being to fight for justice and the protection of human rights. But there
are two conceptions of such a fight both in Islam and the West. The model of the fight
for human rights in the centralist conception is a bureaucracy that imposes its rules on
the cases it administers. The model in the autonomous conception is a scientific
community that solves its differences by principles developed in the community itself.
ملخص الجهاز:
Interrelationship between Human Rights and Peace, Two Mistaken Conceptions of Human Rights in both Islam and the West Ulrich Steinvorth <FootNote No="1" Text="Professor emeritus of Practical Philosophy at Department of Philosophy, Hamburg University, Germany.
True, most contractualists understand “everyone” who must consent to a norm to make it valid as “every rational being”<FootNote No="6" Text=" For instance, See: Scanlon, 1998: 153, defines contractualism as the theory that claims: &amp;quot;An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement.
<FootNote No="7" Text=" According to Maulana Maududi, Sayyed Qutb, Ayatollah Khomeini and other Muslim thinkers, Western political philosophy differs from Islam by placing sovereignty in the state or man rather than in God. Belief that sovereignty rests only in God and therefore human rights must conform to the sharia has also motivated the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) as an alternative to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), initiated by Iran and stated at the 36th UN General Assembly session in 1981, and the &amp;quot;Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam&amp;quot; (CDHRI) of 1990.
Though human rights differ from natural law by a character I’ll point to in a second, according to their adherents they express the unchangeable moral principles that democracy and people’s sovereignty cannot change but only adapt to historical conditions.
Such a conception would not exclude universal principles, such as are implied by natural law and the idea of human and basic rights.
But moral rationalism implies that human rights are valid not because states or people have declared them but because they protect the non-destructive use and development of human capabilities.