خلاصة:
In this paper, with help of the concept of hyper-rationality, we model the interaction
between two investment companies by an important game as trickery game
that has special equilibrium which called hyper-equilibrium. In trickery game, one
company can choose cooperation with another company until the last moment and
finally changes his action to non-cooperation which incur more loss to an opponent.
Indeed, the hyper-equilibrium is the point in which only one player can
displace equilibrium to another point by changing his action which causes profit
or loss to other players so they cannot change their action. Our findings indicate
that the kind of behaviour interactive, environmental conditions, and valuation
system are based on hostility causes an equilibrium point to incur the maximum
loss to an opponent.
ملخص الجهاز:
In order to describe a game based on concept of hyper-rational choice, the payoff functions for each player i is given by: (View the image of this page) where U୧ shows that if player i considers profit (loss) of player j, he will choose an action from a set of available actions which will benefit (lose) player j, for every i, j ∈ {1,2, .
In game Gᇱ , for player 2 we have: based on concept of hyper-rationality, given fixed C for player 1, we can see that if player 2, seeks to incur profit to his opponent, he will choose C (player 1, earns a reward 4), it can conclude that pair of action (C, C) is chosen.
In game Gᇱ , for player 2 we have: based on concept of hyper-rationality, given fixed C for player 1, we can see that if player 2, seeks to incur profit to his opponent, he will choose C (player 1, earns a reward 4), it can conclude that pair of action (C, C) is chosen.
In game Gᇱ , for player 2 we have: based on concept of hyper-rationality, given fixed C for player 1, we can see that if player 2, seeks to incur profit to his opponent, he will choose C (player 1, earns a reward 4), it can conclude that pair of action (C, C) is chosen.