خلاصة:
This paper shows that cooperative grey game theory can help us to establish a fair cost share between private organizations for supporting the temporary housing problem by using facility location games under uncertainty. Temporary accommodation might be a method that ought to get started before a tragedy happens, as a preventative pre-planning. In spite of being temporary constructions, the housing buildings are one of the most essential parts to produce in emergency situations, to contribute to the reconstruction and to recover better. Our study is based on a default earthquake in Izmir of western Turkey. A number of tents are being built in three cities near Izmir. Two companies are selected to distribute the tents in a fair way between the three cities. For this purpose, we use cooperative grey game theory to help us define a fair cost allocation between private organizations for supporting the housing problem by using facility location games under uncertainty.
ملخص الجهاز:
com An Application of Cooperative Grey Games to Post-Disaster Housing Problem Emad Fathi Hussien Qasima, Sırma Zeynep Alparslan Gok*,a and Osman Palancib Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Suleyman Demirel University, Isparta, Turkey Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Suleyman Demirel University, Isparta, Turkey Abstract This paper shows that cooperative grey game theory can help us to establish a fair cost share between private organizations for supporting the temporary housing problem by using facility location games under uncertainty.
For this purpose, we use cooperative grey game theory to help us define a fair cost allocation between private organizations for supporting the housing problem by using facility location games under uncertainty .
Temporary housing; Earthquake; Cooperative grey games; Grey numbers; Facility location situations 1.
tr/deprem-bolgeleri-haritasi?lang=en) In this paper, we focus on an application on a facility location situation and related games with grey data.
The -value : → (ℝ) is defined by (View the image of this page) The -value assigns to every player in a game its grey marginal contribution to the "grand coalition" and distributes the remainder equally among the players (Yilmaz et al, 2018; van den Brink and Funaki, 2009).
More precisely, the cost function is defined by Mallozzi (2011) as follows: (View the image of this page) Facility location games are studied by Nisan et al.
The costs of bringing services of companies (View the image of this page) Figure 3 shows a facility location game with 3 cities (Aydin (Player 1), Usak (Player 2) and Balikesir (Player 3)) in Turkey and 2 companies.