خلاصة:
Optimal resource allocation by means of the price mechanism is one of the main duties of the economics. Optimum allocation is sometimes realized not through the price mechanism, but via assignment algorithms due to an insufficient number of agents on either side of the exchange. Facing the same problem, the kidney market may be considered as a type of market failure that calls for market design. Indeed, such design is regarded as a solution to the problem. Although the current model of organ transplants for non-relative living donors in Iran brings patients certain benefits, it suffers from serious weaknesses that require revisions. The present study aims to analyze the kidney market using a matching theory which is a subset of market design. Then a model is developed in a test market for the research sample in Hamadan Province in 2015. Eventually, recommendations are made to modify the Iranian model of kidney donation. Despite Roth’s model, the proposed model is based on two-sided matching. In this regard, information on 40 kidney suppliers and demanders were recorded in a clearinghouse. Subsequently, agents’ preferences on either side of the market (i.e. patients and donors) were ranked based on blood-type, tissue, duration of disease, age, and gender compatibility. Applying the proposed model to the research sample, the results showed that 19 out of 20 pairs gained access to stable allocations.
ملخص الجهاز:
Mechanism Design, Market Design, Matching Theory, Kidney Exchange Model, Iranian Model of Kidney Donation, Assignment Algorithm JEL Classification: C79, D89, C71, C78.
The present study aims to provide a mechanism to modify the Iranian Model of Kidney Donation (IMKD) based on market design theory and assignment algorithm.
Thus, neither is kidney transplantation in Iran like that in western countries where it is typically from living related donors, nor is there a real kidney market to assign the supply price and demand mechanism.
In the matching process, binary sets will be matched based on honest (non- strategic) preferences in order to design market and avoid market failure, which include the ordered pairs of suppliers and demanders represented as (��, �).
5. 2 Analysis of the Model In the present study, a number of 20 donor-patient pairs of different blood types were selected randomly after due consultation with the Kidney Foundation of Iran2.
Park (2010) showed that, with 11 patient-donor pairs and 2 hospitals, the number of transplantations increased by 50% as compared with when the exchanges were internally organized.
The above-mentioned drawbacks with the Roth’s model result from the fact that it is a one-sided matching approach so that only has one side of the market (patients) a list of preferences.
However, the proposed model for Iran is a two-sided matching mechanism in which either side of the market (patients and donors) has a list of preferences.
Following the accumulation of the data and ranking kidney supplier-demander preferences in the clearinghouse, the algorithm could match 19 out of 20 patient-donor pairs through 19 steps.