خلاصة:
This article lays the groundwork for a defense of rational intuitions by first arguing against a prevalent view according to which intuition is a distinctive psychological state, an “intellectual seeming” that p, that then constitutes evidence that p. An alternative account is then offered, according to which an intuition that p constitutes non-inferential a priori knowledge that p in virtue of the concepts exercised in judging that p. This account of rational intuition as the exercise of conceptual capacities in a priori judgment is then distinguished from the dogmatic, entitlement and reliabilist accounts of intuition’s justificatory force. The article concludes by considering three implications of the proposed view for the Experimental Philosophy movement.
ملخص الجهاز:
8 The account I shall defend holds that a thinker can know, via a priori rational intuition, that P, in virtue of her possessing the concepts involved in the judgment that P, where such possession includes the conceptual capacities exercised in judging that P.
In section II I consider the ontology of rational intuitions and criticize two arguments put forward by Bealer and others to justify a conception of intuition as an experience, a sui generis psychological state or “intellectual seeming” that P (for some proposition P), that in turn carries some justificatory force, or can serve as evidence, for the belief that P.
Against this view I argue that intuitions should be considered a priori, non-inferential, fallible judgings: exercises of conceptual capacities rather than a distinct kind of psychological state that stands in some justificatory or evidentiary relation to a proposition.
Treating rational intuitions as Fregean thoughts about which the thinker possesses indefeasible justification when her fallible conceptual capacities and rational competences are functioning non-defectively, exercises of which stand in a constitutive relation to the Fregean thoughts they produce, averts the fall back into that assumption that in turn elicits the dogmatic, entitlement and reliabilist accounts in the attempt to secure ourselves against skepticism while watching the genuine possibility of a priori knowledge slip from our rational grasp.
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