خلاصة:
در باره رهآورد معرفتی اصل حسن و قبح عقلی از حیث ظنی یا یقینی بودن بین متکلمان و فلاسفه اختلاف نظر وجود دارد که قول به یقینی به متکلمان و ظنی به فلاسفه نسبت داده شده است. در این مقاله نویسنده با روش تحلیلی و بر خلاف ادعای بعض محققان و تفکیک دو معنای اصطلاح «عقلی»، (عقلی مقابل ظنی و مقابل نقلی) نشان داده است که فلاسفه هم طرفدار عقلی بودن حسن و قبح هستند، اما بداهت آن را بر نمی تابند. نگارنده با تحلیل و تحویل نظریه متکلمان به صُور مختلف(ادعای برهانی یا بداهت حسن و قبح، ادعای موجبه کلیه یا جزئیه آن) کوشیده است به جمع آن دو حداقل در فروض و طیف های خاصی بپردازد. هم چنین برای اولین بار در این مقاله روشن خواهد شد که برهانی و بدیهی انگاری حسن و قبح در حد مفهوم حسن عدل و قبح ظلم، مفید مدعای متکلمان نخواهد بود، اما ادعای بداهت مصادیق حسن و قبح، راست آزمایی آن برای عقل در موارد مختلف ممکن نخواهد بود.
Introduction: The rule of intrinsically good and bad (al-husn walqubh)
is one of the most challenging theological principles among
theological schools. The theologians of Ash'ari have denied
intrinsically good and bad and consider it to be merely narration and
religious which is outside the topic of the article. But other
theologians (Imamiya, Mu'tazila and Matoridiyya) were in favor of the
perception of good and bad and considered it self-evident and certain,
but philosophers considered its source to be conjectures (popular
premises, praiseworthy opinions, and accepted premises) and proof in
special cases. On this basis, they have the logical (certainty)
epistemological value in general.
Method of Study: In this article, the author will clarify with an
analytical method that the foundations and arguments of the
theologians' theory in proving the evidence or certainty of good and
bad are weak and can be faulted, although its rationality (in the nonnarrative
sense and including suspicion and certainty) is acceptable.
Findings: Most Imami and Mu'tazila theologians are believe the
above rule that the human mind is capable of distinguishing and
knowing the good and bad of actions, in such a way that it first praises
and condemns the agent of good and bad actions and from that he
infers the praise and condemnation of the lawgiver. They insisted on
the following reasons:
1. Narrative reasons: Many verses and hadiths are used, which
people have considered the principle of the possibility of perception of
intrinsically good and bad to be an absolute and presupposed principle
and based on that, they are spoken to and they are asked to think and
reasoning about good and bad.
It seems that if the theologians mean by proof and certainty of good
and bad in general is concerned by simply referring to the evidence of
the goodness of justice and the badness of injustice, then it is correct,
but the reason for this is the meaning of good and bad returns to the
essence of the meaning of justice and injustice. But if what they mean
by the evidence of good and bad is the claim of the assumption of
good and bad in its examples in general, it is an extravagant claim and
without reason, but a person by conscientious observes many cases
and examples that the reason cannot understand the certainty of good
and bad without Sharia is powerless.
2. Rational reason (evidence): They consider good and bad, like the
goodness of justice and the badness of injustice, as self-evident and
necessary principles, because whoever imagines the truth of justice or
injustice, immediately judges the goodness of justice and the badness
of injustice. The previous fault (goodness of concept of justice and its
evidence and not its example) also apply to this argument.
Philosophers consider the knowledge of good and bad actions for
humans not to be certain, but to be psychological conjecture and
certainty. So that its documentation is not rational and proof-based
reason but popular premises and accepted premises. But it can be
useful for certainty if there is a special reason. They prove their theory
with arguments such as:
1. Denying the evidence of intrinsically good and bad and not
proving it intellectually;
2. Good and bad are the dignity of practical reason (presumptivepopular
premises) not theoretical (proof);
3. Lack of encirclement of reason (theoretical and practical) have
referred to examples of good and bad;
.4Non-belong of evidence to I'tibari.
Conclusion: In this article, it was clarified that the rule of good and
bad cannot be limited to a theological theory (certain), rather it
includes a theory that denies good and bad, but consider the
perception of good and bad intrinsically in its general sense
(presumptive and certainty - rational versus narrative). Finally,
Philosophers have taken issue in claiming the evidence.
ملخص الجهاز:
محل بحث اين مقاله اصل حسن و قبح عقلي و معرفت شناسي است که متکلمان آن را بديهي و برهاني (يقيني) انگاشته اند؛ اما فلاسفه منبع آن را ظنيات (مشهورات ، آراي محموده و مقبولات ) و برهان در موارد خاص انگاشته اند و بر همين اساس هم منکر ارزش معرفتي منطقي (يقيني) به صورت موجبه کليه شده اند؛ اما اصل ادراک حسن و قبح توسط عقل را در حد ظنيات و برهان در موارد محدود و خاص قبول مي کنند.
اين مقدار حسن و قبح عقلي را هر دو نظريه (متکلمان و فلاسفه ) قبول دارند؛ لکن بحث درباره مصاديق خاص حسن و قبح است ؛ مثلاً آيا فلان فعل خاص اولاً حتماً مصداق حسن يا قبح است يا نه ؟ ثانياً آيا عقل آن را به طور قطع و برهاني ميتواند بشناسد يا نه ؟ 14 به نظر ميرسد اگر مراد متکلمان از برهاني و يقينيانگاري حسن و قبح به صورت موجبه کليه در حد مفهوم و تصور به صرف استناد به بداهت حسن عدالت و قبح ظلم باشد، آن درست است ؛ اما پيش تر هم اشاره شد، علت آن به وجود معناي حسن و قبح در بطن معناي عدل و ظلم برميگردد.