چکیده:
U. T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind. He takes above claim as a reasonable scientific hypothesis. I shall argue why it is not as he claims. At first, to pave the way for refutation, I will briefly clarify Place's approach to the subject in hand; although the rest of the paper will also contain more details about his position. Then, I will reduce his position into four theses and try to prove that the main claim of type identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise. I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Place Goes Wrong in Treating Mind-brain Relationship Clarifying why identity theory is neither reasonable nor a mere scientific problem in disguise* Mahdi Soleimani Khourmouji** PhD Candidate in Pilosophy, Imam Khomeini International University of Qazvin, Iran Abstract U.
T. Place claims that philosophical problems concerning the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears or is settled adhering to materialism, especially type identity theory of mind.
I think that we ought to regard type identity theory, at most, just as a hypothesis which approximately displays the function of mind-brain relationship but tells us nothing justifiably about its true nature.
According to statement (1), Place's hypothesis is some sort of intertheoretic reduction adopted for explaining the relationship between events but, at the end, he utilizes it to give a materialistic conclusion about the essential nature of what we called mental.
So in arguing for type identity theory of mind, Place needs to argue for the existence of a kind of proposition that is necessarily true and its truth value determines anyhow by referring to factual states of affairs not exclusively by some linguistic conventions.
As we have seen, Place, sympathetic to Schlick, holds that philosophical problems about the true nature of mind-brain relationship disappears and is settle adhering to materialism and then we will find ourselves faced with a purely scientific issue, namely, whether there is in fact a physiological process that is identical with a given mental event.
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