چکیده:
Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. Considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, Stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. A general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract and centralized structure. Based on this model, we numerically analyzed the performance of revenue sharing contract in the considered supply chain and four states for revenue sharing contract are analyzed at the end. Moreover, in each state, performance of the system under revenue sharing contract is compared with the performance of the system under wholesale price contract and centralized structure.
خلاصه ماشینی:
"com Modeling and numerical analysis of revenue sharing contract based on the Stackelberg game theory Hasan Rasay a, Yahia Zare Mehrjerdi a, Mohammad Saber Fallah Nezhad *a a Yazd University, Yazd, Iran Abstract Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory.
Keywords: vendor managed inventory; Stackelberg game; revenue sharing contract; wholesale price contract; centralized structure.
al consider a tow level supply chain as the following form: the upstream manufacturer produces a single product and sells it though a vertically separated retailer, under a consignment contract with revenue sharing and slotting allowance.
In this paper, we extend the previous literature by considering the issue of revenue sharing and wholesale price contracts in a Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) model of a single-vendor and multiple-retailers where the demands at retailers’ side are price-sensitive.
In general, the effect of this contract can be expressed as follows: the vendor sells product by a very low wholesale price (in this case it is zero) to the retailers, in return, he/she gets a high percent of the retailers’ revenue (0.
In general, the effect of changing parameter can be expressed as: cp pi Di qi i v t It is also concluded that the retailers receive product by lower wholesale price at the higher values of and the retailers’ profits always decrease in spite of increasing .
Stackelberg game-theoretic model for optimizing advertising,pricing and inventory policies in vendor managed inventory(VMI) production supply chains."