Framing Political Islam: Syria’s MuslimBrotherhood and the 2011 Uprising مقاله

American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Fall 2016, Volume 33 - Number 4 (‎22 صفحه - از 1 تا 22 )

چکیده:

What aspects of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s (a.k.a. the Ikhwan) cultural/ideological framing contributed to its failure to gather opponents of the Assad regime around its leadership dur- ing the 2011uprising? What does this reveal about why some Is- lamist political parties failed in situations of high political contention, such as the Syrian civil war? I argue that despite con- siderable evolution in the Syrian Brotherhood’s cultural/ideolog- ical framing since its first uprising (1977-82), it failed to target three crucial aspects of the 2011 uprising: the military struggle, the masses, and the religious minorities. My research outlines how the movement’s ideological shift toward non-violence and post-1982 reorientation toward democratic elections (ironically) prevented its members from playing a leadership role in what was mainly an armed struggle. At the same time, my research outlines how this evolution and its related changes attracted nei- ther the masses, which remained oriented toward the traditional economic elites, nor the Sunni-oriented religious minorities. I argue that these three crucial aspects undermined the Ikhwan’s efforts and illustrate how poor cultural/ideological framing can doom even those Islamist political parties with the strongest re- source mobilization capacities and previously unmatched situa- tions of political opportunity structures.

خلاصه ماشینی:

Framing Political Islam: Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood and the 2011 Uprising Amir Abdul Reda Abstract What aspects of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s (a. I argue that despite con- siderable evolution in the Syrian Brotherhood’s cultural/ideolog- ical framing since its first uprising (1977-82), it failed to target three crucial aspects of the 2011 uprising: the military struggle, the masses, and the religious minorities. ’”19 As the Brotherhood was unable to gather opponents of the Assad regime around its leadership during 2011, despite high levels of resources for mobilization and considerable political opportunities, more attention ought to be given to how the group frames its ideology. The Failure of the Brotherhood’s Framing Despite these important above-mentioned shifts, the organization could not create social support for itself and mobilize the anti-regime opposition around its leadership due to its inappropriate approach to the current upris- ing’s three crucial components: the military struggle, the masses, and the re- ligious minorities. Khatib, Lefevre, and Qureshi, State and Islam in Baathist Syria, 23-24; “The Syrian National Council,” Carnegie Middle East Center, September 25, 2013, available online: http://carnegie-mec. Khatib, Lefevre, and Qureshi, State and Islam in Baathist Syria, 23-24; “The Syrian National Council,” Carnegie Middle East Center. uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995 (last consulted on December 1, 2013); Dominic Evans, “Syrian PM tells ally Iran Assad is winning civil war,” Reuters, November 30, 2013, available online: http://uk. org/sada/2013/10/29/militias-for-syrian-muslim-brotherhood/grhp (Page consulted on December 4, 2013); Khatib, Lefevre, and Qureshi, State and Islam in Baathist Syria, 23.

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