چکیده:
با روی کار آمدن شاهپور دوم ساسانی ( 379-309م)، منازعات ساسانیان و رومی‌ها وارد مرحلۀ جدیدی شد. سیاست شاهپور دوم در این دوره، دستیابی به شهرهای ثروتمند سوریه بود. برای تحقق این هدف، او سه‌بار در دهۀ 340 م. تلاش کرد ازطریق تصرف شهر نصیبین و عبور از بخش علیای رود فرات وارد سوریه شود که هر سه‌بار ناکام برگشت. شاهپور دوم در سال 359م. به پیشنهاد آنتونیوس، یکی از سرداران رومی، تصمیم گرفت این‌بار از بخش میانی رود فرات به‌‌طرف سوریه پیشروی کند که این‌بار هم با شکست مواجه شد. هدف از این پژوهش پاسخ به این سؤال اساسی است که چرا شاهپور دوم با وجود انتخاب تاکتیک جنگی جدید، یعنی حملۀ مستقیم به سوریه در جنگ 359 م. شکست خورد. به نظر می رسد نامۀ سری پروکوپیوس، یکی از سفرای رومی در ایران که توانست مخفیانه برنامۀ جنگی شاهپور را برای حملۀ مستقیم به سوریه به اطلاع رومیان برساند، در این شکست نقش اساسی داشت؛ زیرا رومی‌ها پس از اطلاع از نقشۀ جنگی شاهپور دوم، اقدامات مختلفی ازجمله تقویت دفاعی ساحل فرات، تخریب یا محافظت از پل‌های آن، رویارویی‌نداشتن مستقیم با سپاهیان شاهپور و حضور در قلاع دفاعی شهرها در بین‌النهرین را در پیش گرفتند. با این استراتژی، آنها موفق شدند تا با اقدامات بازدارنده، از پیشروی سپاهیان شاهپور در سوریه جلوگیری کنند. با توجه به اینکه که تا کنون دربارۀ نقش نامۀ سری پروکوپیوس در شکست شاهپور دوم در جنگ سال 359م.، پژوهش مستقلی انجام نشده است، بنابراین در این پژوهش تلاش شده است که با تکیه بر منابع نوشتاری کهن رومی، شواهد باستان‌شناسی و ارزیابی موقعیت جغرافیایی منطقه و با رویکرد تاریخی و روش توصیفی‌تحلیلی، دلایل ناکامی حملۀ شاهپور دوم به سوریه و نقش نامۀ سری پروکوپیوس در این شکست بررسی شود.
Abstract:As Shahpour II (379-309 AD) came to power, the Roman-Sasanian conflicts entered a new phase. The policy of Shahpour II during this period was to gain access to the rich cities of Syria. To achieve his goal, he tried to enter Syria three times after capturing the city of Nisibis in the north of Mesopotamia in the 340s AD, but he failed and retreated each time. In 359 AD, at the suggestion of Antonius, he decided to advance directly towards Syria by crossing the Euphrates River, but he failed again.The purpose of this study is to answer the basic question of why Shahpour II was defeated in the war in 359 AD despite choosing a new war tactic, namely direct attack on Syria. It seems that the secret letter of Procopius, who secretly informed the Roman generals about Shahpour's war plan, played a key role in this failure.Following the Romans' knowledge of Shahpour's decision to invade Syria, various measures were taken to counter Shahpour’s corps. With this strategy, they succeeded in preventing the advance of his troops into Syria. Therefore, based on the written sources of ancient Romans, archaeological evidence, and evaluation of the geographical location of the region, the role of Procopius in this defeat was investigated with a historical approach and a descriptive-analytical method in this study.Introduction:With the continuation of the Sassanian and Roman conflicts and Shahpour II coming to power (379-309 AD) in the 4th century AD, these conflicts entered a new phase. The Sasanians’ policy in this period, in particular during the reign of Shahpour II, was to gain access to the rich cities of Syria. Thus, when Shupour II consolidated his power, the Sasanian and Roman conflicts speeded up. In the first step, Shahpour II tried to gain access to Syria during the reign of Constantinus II. To achieve this goal, he first had to capture the city of Nisibis, which strategically played a key role in the advance of Sassanians into Upper Mesopotamia and their access to the important cities of Syria. Accordingly, Shapour II tried three times in the 340s AD to enter Syria by capturing the city of Nisibis and crossing the upper Euphrates River, but the damage inflicted in his forces during the siege of Nisibis each time, prevented the Sassanian army from advancing towards Syria, and resulting retreatment of his forces.Shahpour II, who was still seeking to dominate the eastern Mediterranean regions, again prepared his army for a campaign in Syria in the spring of 359 AD. As he had a failed experience of conquering Nisibis and Roman fortresses in the north of Mesopotamia in the past, he decided to adopt a new and unexpected strategy to conquer Syria this time at the suggestion of Antonius, a Roman general, who had taken refuge in Shahpour's court and was aware of the Roman defense plan. Instead of heading north across Mesopotamia and continuing the long and unsuccessful siege of the cities of Nisibis and Amada, he decided to move directly towards Syria, this time bypassing the Roman forts in Mesopotamia and crossing the bridges on the Euphrates River. However, Procopius, who had previously been sent to his court as a Roman ambassador for reconciliation, sent a secret letter to Roman Generals in the field and informed them of Shahpour II new plan. As soon as the Romans were informed of this new plan, they tried to use new military tactics to neutralize his plan and prevent him from capturing Syria by crossing the bridges over the Euphrates River. Thus, his operation to enter Syria failed and he was forced to retreat again in 359 AD.Although a lot of researches, such as The Eastern Frontier of the Roman Empire with Special Reference to the Reign of Constantius II by Lightfoot (1981) and Perceptions of Eastern Frontier Policy in Ammianus, Libanius, and Julian (337–363)” by Seager (2007), have been done and even Procopius’ secret letter has been examined and analyzed by some scholars like Blockley so far, no independent study has been conducted on the importance and role of Procopius’s secret letter, which helped the Romans know the main objectives of Shahpour II in the war of 359 AD and accordingly use appropriate tactics against him to ultimately defeat of him in this campaign. Materials and MethodsIn this research, based on the written sources of ancient Romans, archaeological evidence, and evaluation of the geographical location of the region and with a historical approach and descriptive-analytical method, it was tried to investigate the reasons for Shahpour’s failure of the invasion of Syria in 359 AD and the role of Procopius's secret letter in his defeat in this operation. Discussion of Results and ConclusionThe purpose of this study was to answer the fundamental question of why Shahpour II failed to enter Syria and his troops went towards the northern cities of Mesopotamia to surround Amada City but were eventually forced to retreat and were thus defeated despite adopting a new tactic of war in 359 AD, namely a direct attack on Syria by crossing the bridges on the Euphrates River. It seems that the secret letter of Procopius, who was able to secretly inform the Romans about Shahpour's war plan of adopting new tactics for a direct attack on Syria, played a key role in this defeat. After learning the battle plan of Shahpour II, the Romans took various measures to counter his corps. Also, among other things, they used the scorched-earth policy by destroying the fields and water wells, strengthen the defenses of the coast of the Euphrates River, destroying or protecting its bridges to prevent his corps to cross the river, and avoiding direct confrontation with his troops. They also maintained their military power by stationing their troops in fortifications of the cities and strong Roman forts in Mesopotamia. With this strategy, they succeeded in preventing the advance of Shahpour's troops into Syria.
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