چکیده:
درحال حاضر، برنامهریزان شهری و منطقهای کشورهای درحال توسعه درکنترل پراکندهرویی با چالشهای عدیدهای مواجه هستند. کلانشهرها و مناطق کلانشهری، محیطهایی پیچیده، متنوع و محل انباشت ثروت و سرمایه در مقیاس ملی هستند، و همین ویژگی امکان شکلگیری شبکههای فساد با هدف دستیابی به سود و منفعت بیشتر در این مناطق را افزایش میدهد. درچنین شرایطی، فهم فرایند شکلگیری این شبکهها و سنجش و ارزیابی ساختارهای محرک فرایندهای غیررسمی امری ضروری است. این پژوهش به دنبال سنجش و ارزیابی ائتلافهای منطقهای محرک رشد و گسترش فضایی فزاینده منطقه کلانشهری تهران و شناسایی عاملین کلیدی آن است. پژوهش حاضر از نوع توصیفی-تحلیلی است و برای گردآوری دادههای میدانی از پرسشنامهای با امتیازدهی طیف لیکرت استفاده شده که شامل 252 نفر در ساختارهای ائتلافی منطقه است. نتایج نشان میدهد بخش خصوصی در مقایسه با 2 بخش دیگر رژیم ائتلاف، نقش تأثیرگذارتری در شبکه تصرف اراضی منطقه کلانشهری تهران دارد. کمترین سهم نیز در هر سه حوزه قدرت، اعمال نفوذ و منفعت مربوط به مردم بهترتیب با نمره میانگین وزنی 2.09، 1.92 و 2.58 است. سنجش و ارزیابی اثرات ساختارهای سازمانی-نهادی، نشان از نقش بیبدیل نهادهای کمیسیونی در فرایند تصرفات اراضی منطقه دارد. درنهایت شناسایی ذینفعان، بیانگر ترکیبی از حضور هر 3 دسته ساختارهای سازمانی-نهادی در بین ذینفعان اصلی و ثانویه است.
Currently, urban and regional planners in developing countries are facing many challenges in controlling urban sprawl. Metropolises and metropolitan regions are complex, diverse environments where wealth and capital accumulate on a national scale, and this feature increases the possibility of forming corruption networks with the aim of achieving more profit and benefit in these regions. In such a situation, it is essential to understand the formation process of these networks and measure and evaluate the structures that drive informal processes. This research seeks to measure and evaluate the regional coalitions that stimulate the growth and spatial expansion of the Tehran metropolitan region. The research method is descriptive-analytical, and a Likert-scale questionnaire was used to collect information, which was completed by 252 participants. The results show that compared to the other two sectors of the coalition regime, the private sector has played a more significant role in the land occupation network of the Tehran metropolitan region, and to be more precise, it has created informal processes that create urban sprawl. The lowest share across all three areas of power, influence and interest is related to the public with a weighted average score of 2.09, 1.92 and 2.58 respectively. Measuring and evaluating the effects of organizational-institutional structures shows the unique role of commission institutions in the process of land occupations in the region. Finally, the identification of the stakeholder indicates a combination of all three categories of organizational-institutional structures among the main and secondary stakeholders. Although some institutional-organizational actors have a greater role in the growth and expansion of the growing spatial-physical region by gaining more points in the form of primary and secondary stakeholders, it is evident that the current explosive growth is not limited to the performance of any single organization or institution related to the urban land. Instead the connections between these institutions are synergistic with the mechanism of influence of other elements of the coalition regime (private sector and the public) in the form of a network that facilitates such conditions. Under these circumstances, it is not possible for the government or the market alone to manage the challenge of encroachment on sacred and surrounding lands and informal processes related to land and housing in the region. Instead, it requires institutionalization. More precisely, the formation of a suitable institutional environment that can support public interests rather than short-term interests of those with power, interest, and influence. In addition, this institutional environment should be based on strengthening individual and organizational-institutional understanding and awareness of the region and be accompanied by social demands. In such a way that all stakeholders and actors in the field of urban land voluntarily advocate for the preservation and protection of the region’s lands. Overall, it seems that the will of the private sector, social structures, and even contrary to the expectation, the organizational-institutional structures of the region, are in service of violations and informal processes with a self-interested view.