چکیده:
با فرض پذیرش این گزارة کلی که قوانین و مقرراتی که برای قراردادهای کوتاه مدت تنظیم میشوند، لزوما قادر به تامین نیازهای قراردادهای بلندمدت نیستند، در حقوق داخلی و حقوق بین المللی درخصوص قراردادهای بلندمدت سرمایه گذاری خارجی و به خصوص قراردادهای بالادستی نفتی و گازی، نگرش مشترکی وجود دارد مبنیبر اینکه این گونه قراردادها اغلب تحت تاثیر تغییر شرایط و اوضاع واحوال قرار میگیرند. *** طبق این نگرش، گرچه افراد بایستی خسارات ناشی از حوادث غیرقابل پیش بینی در قراردادهای کوتاه مدت را خود برعهده بگیرند اما این مسئله درمورد روابط بلندمدت همیشه صادق نیست. در قراردادهای بلندمدت، تغییر شرایط و اوضاع واحوال میتواند تعادل قراردادی را برهم زده و مانع تداوم توافق اولیه طرفین ـ مبتنیبر تعادل اقتصادی قرارداد ـ شود. در چنین شرایطی اگر منافع طرفین در تداوم قرارداد باشد، راه حل، مذاکرة مجدد است؛ آنچه بازتابی از تنش میان نیاز تجاری به حصول نتیجه در قراردادهای بلندمدت تجاری بین المللی و عدم امکان پیش بینی و تنظیم تمام شرایط محتمل در آینده در متن قرارداد است
Assuming that the rules formulated for short-term contracts will not be suitable for the needs of relationships that should continue over a period of time, it has been accepted both in domestic law and international law that an international investment contract, particularly upstream petroleum contracts, may be influenced by change in circumstances. People are supposed to bear the losses arising from unexpected situations in short-term, but that is not always the case in long-term relationships. Significant changes could occur in the economic and social conditions surrounding foreign investment contracts. Petroleum contracts, in particular, are negotiated under complex and uncertain circumstances. Therefore, the parties’ foreseeability to predict all the contingencies is limited and every possible eventuality in contract cannot be specified in advance. Under these circumstances, one option is for the parties to accept reasonable requests for renegotiation by their partner when the contractual or financial equilibrium has been severely disrupted by external events.
خلاصه ماشینی:
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“Is the Duty to Cooperate in Long-term Contracts a Substantive Transnational Rule in International Commercial Arbitration?.
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