Abstract:
In this, paper, I am going to present an argument in favour of generalism and criticise the particularistic position in moral reasoning... According to generalism which is associated with supervenience, the way in which a morlly relevant feature contributes to the moral evaluation of different contexts is patternable. However, a particularist like Dancy utilizes the very idea of resultance instead of supervenience to give an account of how a non-moral feature behaves in different contexts. An account drawn from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts is presented here to criticise the particulristic position while endorsing the very idea of supervenience and the generilistic position with regard to the extent of the patternability of the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different contexts
Machine summary:
An account drawn from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts is presented here to criticise the particulristic position while endorsing the very idea of supervenience and the generilistic position with regard to the extent of the patternability of the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different contexts .
Key words: Wittgenstein, Ethical supervenience, generalism, particularistic Introduction What can we say with regard to the extent of the patternability of the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature in different ethical contexts?
Therefore, according to Dancy, the idea of resultance, unlike supervenience, can better systematise our common sensical intuitions with regard to the way in which several morally relevant features are combined together in different ethical contexts .
2. Criticising the Particularistic Position: Wittgensteinian account of normativity In order to criticise Dancy’s constitutive and metaphysical claim concerning the way a morally relevant feature contributes to the moral evaluation of different contexts, I draw on the account from Wittgenstein with regard to the nature of concepts .
Considering Wittgensteinian account of patternability and the way in which the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature is answerable and responsive to patterns of word use, it seems that Dancy’s claim about the very idea of supervenience is implausible.
According to Dancy - as there is no such thing as an exactly similar ethical situation - to say that the reason-giving behaviour of a morally relevant feature would be answerable to general patterns in other ethical contexts is useless .