Abstract:
Over the centuries, beginning with the classic Greeks through the trends of the mid-20th century, philosophical enterprise has been intricately and seemingly irretrievably rooted in the theory of the given—an edification of philosophy as that giant mirror and standard for measuring what counts as knowledge; but is it thus synonymous with or reducible to epistemology? How or why? There are two answers to both of these questions. The attempt in this work is to delineate those separate concerns, their areas of convergence and disparity, but also indicated the genesis of edifying philosophy rooted in epistemology but which has been discredited in the works of some post-modernist reformers—Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty. Against theirs, this piece shows that historically, philosophizing has had a methodology and some perceptual axioms; that it is not easy to abdicate it from this mode, no matter the will and zeal—for success is not a matter of will alone; that the post-modernists revolution is nothing new with its swollen nerves and arteries (as others before it, it soon wanes). It concludes that the urge for philosophic understanding shows no sign of abating and so the philosophical journey will probably go on and on, each stage building on and rewriting its past and ruminating specific but perennial problematic; that while some of the issues seemingly do appear resolved, others may have endured and eloped any final solution; and finally that the philosophical method and basic assumptions have seriously remained firmly even beyond post-modernist restructurers.
Machine summary:
That Philosophy as Epistemological-Based is Not Debased: A Critique of Post-Modernist/Hermeneutic Critique of Traditional Philosophy* Anthony Afe. Asekhauno Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Benin, Nigeria Wesley Taiwo Osemwegie** Lecturer at University of Benin, Nigeria (corresponding author) Abstract Over the centuries, beginning with the classic Greeks through the trends of the mid-20th century, philosophical enterprise has been intricately and seemingly irretrievably rooted in the theory of the given—an edification of philosophy as that giant mirror and standard for measuring what counts as knowledge; but is it thus synonymous with or reducible to epistemology?
The attempt in this work is to delineate those separate concerns, their areas of convergence and disparity, but also indicated the genesis of edifying philosophy rooted in epistemology but which has been discredited in the works of some post- modernist reformers—Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty.
In other words, our concern is to ex-ray the bases or the instances, in a historical trajectory, where philosophy can be inextricably linked with epistemology or epistemological problems, which have given a kind of purported fertile- ground for this attempt at what John Dewey calls “reconstructions of philosophy”, and which had been championed by especially Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, John Dewey, Quine, and recently more practically articulated by Richard Rorty (1979).
Importantly, we must recall that the objective of this section was / is historicize philosophic discourse and we have found out that through the pre- Socratic, the Socratic, the medieval, modern times, philosophy ruminated between recurring problems: of being- justice, knowledge, justification, reason, matter, mind and consciousness, using the language–game.
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