Abstract:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has always faced sanctions and its foreign policy and relations with other countries, especially the United States and the European Union, were practiced under the impact of the sanctions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, 2015), reached after successive years of sanctions, has proponents and opponents inside the country, who have different views about its effects on the Iranian and American foreign policy. The proponents believe that the JCPOA will put an end to the U.S. sanction’s policy against the I.R.I. While the authors of this article believe that due to the Middle East’s complex situation, growth of terrorism, as well as the transitional circumstances of the region’s geopolitical condition, the occurrence of such theory seems unlikely. The main question of this paper is: What is the impact of the JCPOA on the U.S. foreign policy, especially sanctions policy, against the Islamic Republic of Iran (I.R.I.) in post-JCPOA? According to our hypothesis, financial, economic, military, and defence sanctions have been institutionalized in the U.S. strategic document as an effective, tested policy to contain the I.R.I. military and economic power and would not be wiped out from the U.S. foreign policy. Sanction theories have successfully secured the interests of the U.S. and its regional allies, such as the Zionist regime and Saudi Arabia. They are, therefore, opposed to the release of the Iranian financial energy or a dramatic increase in the I.R.I. power in the region as it, prompting the success of the resistance axis and facilitating the dominance of the Islamic Republic in the region, will be against their objectives. Considering the U.S. political elite mentality, the existing discourse against I.R.I. nuclear agreement as well as the U.S. achievements, through imposed sanctions against I.R.I., adoption of new sanctions by the U.S. politicians in post-JCPOA would be very likely.
Machine summary:
"Studying the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy and relations with its neighbouring countries from the Persian Gulf to South-eastern Asia, Katzman, a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, enumerates the arguments proposed by those who are against the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as follows: 1) the release of Iran’s financial resources and the access of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s government to resources required for technologies of ballistic missiles and rockets, hence the possibility of expansion of proxy wars in the region; 2) lifting of arms embargo, increased power of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s naval force, especially in the Strait of Hormuz, hence further empowerment of the country’s military might and regional influence; 3) the Islamic Republic’s access to financial resources in order to support the opposition forces to the regional governments, such as Bahraini opposition; 4) establishment of a trade relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and international economy and expansion of its trade relations with African and Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, otherwise suspended so far due to sanctions (Katzman, 2016: 34–35).
Although, with regard to the US political environment on the eve of Presidential elections and certain obstacles and ambiguities of the JCPOA, establishing cooperation between the two countries in the short run seems impossible, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran can meanwhile take measures to establish and solidify grounds for expansion of regional and international interactions and cooperation especially with European Union Member States, hence simulating the environment of Iran’s international activities just like that which existed during the pre-sanctions era, that is, when there was no consensus on sanctions policies among the European Union, the United States and other international bodies."