Abstract:
Management is trying to maximize your rewards and that means in terms of net
profit, return on investment (performance) or other accounting measures and also by
trying to Making positive changes in the prices of corporate securities to be done. In
other words, the maximum managers Their interests are trying to improve corporate
performance and the improvement of the capital Investors will be aware of the
attention and increased trade and thus share in research Willing to "review the independent
non-executive directors' fees from the perspective of agency theory" discussed
Is.
The sample is composed of 92 companies selected by systematic elimination Is. The
company had a total of 460 years. To analyze the data analysis and hypothesis testing
This software has been used 7 EVIEWS according to regression analysis, the
following results were obtained: Between independent non-executive director's fees
and visible efforts there is a significant positive relationship manager. Between
independent non-executive directors' fees and the number of board meetings there is
a significant positive relationship
Machine summary:
In other words, the maximum managers Their interests are trying to improve corporate performance and the improvement of the capital Investors will be aware of the attention and increased trade and thus share in research Willing to "review the inde- pendent non-executive directors' fees from the perspective of agency theory" dis- cussed Is. The sample is composed of 92 companies selected by systematic elimination Is. The company had a total of 460 years.
To analyze the data analysis and hypothesis test- ing This software has been used 7 EVIEWS according to regression analysis, the following results were obtained: Between independent non-executive director's fees and visible efforts there is a significant positive relationship manager.
3. 1 Research Hypotheses Research hypothesis according as it is presented as follows: First hypothesis: the remuneration of non-executive and independent director's visible effort and there is a significant positive relationship manager.
1 Analysis of the First Hypothesis First hypothesis: the remuneration of non-executive and independent director's visible effort and there is a significant positive relationship manager.
The estimated coefficient of the variable remuneration of non-executive independent directors on effort View of managers 0/0000144 t is 0 and p-Value This variable according to statistics, results A significant indicator of this factor in the level of 5 percent.
These findings Show that variable remuneration of non-executive independent directors on the number of board meetings A significant and positive impact and probability of t-statistic variables financial leverage ratio of total debt to total value Total assets and total return per- formance of the company that is stock on the number of board meetings more The level of 5% is cal- culated, so coefficients calculated at 95% Is not significant.