Abstract:
In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally. This article studies the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and intention? Or are virtues necessary merely for the moral or epistemic character of the agent and not his agency? If virtues are constructive elements of personal identity, can we say that virtues are necessary for action and agency? If we accept that virtues play a role in agency, the principle of “Ought Implies Can” makes us face a new challenge; which we will discuss. After explaining the concept of action and agency, I will study the relationship between agency and virtues in the field of ethics and epistemology. Ultimately, I conclude that not only in theories of virtue but also in other ethical theories, virtue is independently necessary for the actualization of agency; even if, conceptually, there might not be any relation between the two. In many cases, virtue can also have a crucial role in prudential agency.
Machine summary:
This article studies the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and intention?
In the same way that this principle questions the necessary relation between moral obligation and the ability of the agent in ethics and in epistemology there is discussion regarding the relationship between the ability of the epistemic agent in attaining belief and the necessity of believing; so, here too, according to this principle, one can ask whether the agent can even possess virtues in such a manner that agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on virtues?
The present paper strives to define action and determine its formative components and then delves into theories of virtue so that by studying the capacities of the theory of virtue in ethics and epistemology, it can arrive at some probable answers in relation to the question of whether philosophers of action allow virtue – as an independent element – to also be necessary alongside choice, intention, and desire so that the meaning of action, its performance, and agency are all bound to possessing virtue too.
That which is presently important is that whether or not we accept intention or free will to be a necessary condition of action, that which is definite is that according to philosophers of action, firstly, agency shows itself in intentional or voluntary actions and the agent must have reasons for action in order to act; regardless of whether intention can be defined in terms of these reasons in some explanations.