Abstract:
The main challenge of present paper is analytical comparing the “Criterion of Valid Cognition” from viewpoints of Epicureanism and Charvaka (Lokayata) philosophy, the largest exponent of Indian materialism. The new findings of the research show that the whole construction of ontology, ethics, and infidelity of Charvaka is logically based on its epistemology. In this philosophy, any intangible existence is denied, and the only knowledgeable subject-matter is assumed to be the material world. So here firstly, the acquisition of the truth is possible solely by sensory instruments, and secondly, every ‘should’ and ‘should not’ that is in contrary to the principle of material pleasure is negated. It can be said that the Charvaka’s philosophers consider Cognition as the ‘true and perceptible belief, but not reasonable one’, and they intensely questioned the validity of Inference, Testimony and Analogy. In contrast, the Epicurean philosophers seem to agree with the definition of Cognition as the ‘true and justifiable conviction’. In spite of believing in the originality of matter and regarding the ‘clarity of sensory perception’ as the criterion of truth, Epicureans consider also Inference, Preconceptions and Emotions as the resources of cognition. Epicureanism’s epistemology is entirely rational, but that of Charvaka is irrational, empirical, contradictory, sense-based and contrary to Reality.
Machine summary:
Charvaka's insight on the sole reality of the corporeal world, the negation of metaphysical matters, the acceptance of sensory perception (Pratiasca) as the only reliable source of knowledge and negation of other sources, arose in the period when Brahmins usually used other famous cognitive sources, such as inference (Anumana), as well as testimony of sacred texts (Vedas) to justify their religious beliefs and practices (Damodaran, 1967: 106).
The ‘Criterion of Truth’ in Epicurean philosophy: Possibility and nature of cognition Despite the fact that Epicurus presents completely materialistic explanations about God, Man and the Universe, and considers all the three categories as composed of different types of atoms, his intellectual framework is based on both empirical and rational foundations.
’ Validity of sensory perception Unlike to the majority of Indian philosophical schools that acknowledge the validity of almost all the sources of knowledge (Mittal, et al, 2007: 537), and contrary to the idealistic philosophies of Buddhism such as the Maddhmayaka (Shunya-vada) and the Yoga-chara (Vijnana-vada) that respectively saw sensory perception as products of a universal illusion, or consider it as artifacts of the human mind, and therefore do not essentially give it an ontological credit (see: Shayegan, 2010: 2 / 446), Charvaka's thinkers recognize the sensory perception as the only resource of valid knowledge and the only criterion of truth (Warren Myers, 2001: 30).
The Charvaka philosophers mainly questioned the validity of the analogy, testimony and inference as the valid sources of knowledge, and considered the clarity of sensory perception as the only standard criterion of Truth.
Charvaka philosophers consider only the clarity of sensory perception as the criterion of truth and denied the validity of inference, analogy, and testimony.