Abstract:
W. V. Quine borrows the principle of charity from Neil Wilson, but modifies and enriches its content to fit into his naturalistic philosophy and epistemology. While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible. According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the principles of psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection, which Quine uses in the contexts akin to that of the principle of charity, are not but different terms for one basic idea. Given the ties between the principle of charity and rationality, Quine's wide use of the principle and its affiliated notions proves that rationality is a central, often neglected, idea in his philosophy. The paper begins with an introductory account of the brief explanation Wilson gives of the principle of charity. Then it spells out four concepts or principles of charity, psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection showing how these four notions or principles basically express the same thing. Examining the relation of these last three principles with the principle of charity and rationality, the paper's main objective is to highlight the centrality of common rationality in Quine's philosophy, despite the common view that Quine is purely engaged with semantical aspects of Language.
Machine summary:
While Wilson ties this principle to the notion of truth, Quine’s attempts in finding a ground for it lead him to the concept of common rationality shared by all human beings, which is ultimately what makes communication, as the basis of our social life, possible.
According to the paper's argument, three other expressions, that is, the principles of psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection, which Quine uses in the contexts akin to that of the principle of charity, are not but different terms for one basic idea.
2-1) the Principle of Charity Quine borrows “the principle of charity” from Wilson and makes use of it, particularly in cases of translating truth functions, observation sentences, and analytical hypotheses.
In other words, according to this principle, we don't have to represent the speaker as someone who denies the sentences on their truth there is common agreement or consensus and thus they can be called “obvious”, as Quine defines it: I must stress that I am using the word 'obvious' in an ordinary behavioral sense, with no epistemological overtones.
Accordingly, Quine, with his principle of empathy, attempts to offer a naturalistic account of our common rationality which makes it possible for us to assume that other subjects are also thinking and uttering sentences in a similar way.
3) The four principles of charity, psychological plausibility, empathy, and projection have almost the same meaning in Quine’s philosophy and their common function is to establishes the common rationality underlying communication, speaking and human relations, which in principle makes all these possible.