Abstract:
The present article intends to explore discernible shift in Iran’s foreign policy toward Latin American countries in recent years. Iran’s relations with Cuba، Venezuela، Bolivia، Ecuador، Nicaragua، Peru، and more recently، Brazil، have grown warmer in recent years. The ever-increasing scale and scope of diplomatic ties and bilateral economic cooperation agreements between Iran and these Latin American states، most of whom pursue generally radical، anti-US policies، demonstrate the changing orientation in the Iranian policy as well as in the dynamics of the Latin American politics. The emergence of an Iranian president in 2005 with a populist outlook and pronounced anti-US/Anti-Western rhetoric has facilitated the closer ties between Iran and the leftist Latin American governments. This aspect of the Iranian policy has drawn both domestic criticism and outside opposition، particularly from the United States. Given this، a major question that could be raised is whether the new trend will be a long term feature of Iranian foreign policy or a temporary، transient one، especially taking into account the major role played by the personality of these countries’ leaders in their policymaking. A related question is whether these heads of states will be able to create the necessary institutions، processes، and coordination mechanisms to remain in place even after they leave office. The author looks at the recent developments in these politico-economic relations، and tries to examine the degree of long-term resilience of Tehran’s current involvement in Latin America. The main conclusion of the paper is that for as long as the Islamic Republic of Iran feels the need to look for countervailing force in its ongoing conflict with the US and the West، the current policies in seeking close political and economic ties with the anti-Western and radical Latin American states، as part of a larger coalition of like-minded developing countries، will continue .
Machine summary:
The main conclusion of the paper is that for as long as the Islamic Republic of Iran feels the need to look for countervailing force in its ongoing conflict with the US and the West, the current policies in seeking close political and economic ties with the anti-Western and radical Latin American states, as part of a larger coalition of like-minded developing countries, will continue.
In so far as the rationale for Iran’s post-2005 rapid expansion of relations with Latin America is concerned, three critical issues might explain the new drive to establish closer ties with the "non-hostile" and "non-aligned" Latin American states: one, the post- revolutionary tradition of anti-imperialist outlook and orientation in world affairs necessitating search for like-minded allies; two, the political imperative of search for and enlisting the support of other states for Iran’s embattled nuclear program; and three, the long-standing pragmatism of sheer economic interests, especially for an oil-export- dependent economy.
(56) While criticizing Russia, China and the NAM members of the Board (notably India) which had voted for the IAEA resolutions, Ahmadinejad applauded Venezuelan government which had voted against the September 2005, February 2006, and November 2009 resolutions, and for its help in rallying Latin American support for Iran’s nuclear program.
Along the same lines, Iran’s official news agency (IRNA) reported in mid-July 2010 (two months after the adoption of the UNSC resolution) that the five Ambassadors and heads of mission of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela – member states of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) – issued a statement at a meeting hosted by the Embassy of Venezuela in Tehran declaring their support for Iran’s nuclear program and criticized the "destabilizing and militaristic approach of the US government and its allies, especially the Zionist regime.